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ENFORCING INSIDER TRADING LAW:
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
Viviane Muller Prado*
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is a source of many controversies. Some authors
argue that the market would be more efficient if trading based on insider
information was allowed.1 On the other hand, empirical studies suggest that
the consequences of effectively banning insider trading are lower capital
costs, higher liquidity, and investor protection.2
This Article starts with the assumption that insider trading rules are
important for markets. But to have positive results, it is not enough that a
particular legal system sets a rule banning trading on material, nonpublic
information. Studies suggest that to be effective in deterring illegal trading
the rules must be clear and comprehensive, sanctions significant,3 and
enforcement effective.4
* The author is grateful for comments and suggestions in various stages of the
development of this article to David Trubek, Zohar Goshen, Merritt Fox, Marco
Ventoruzzo, Jed Kroncke, Urska Vellikonja, David Webber and to participants of the
Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop in Boston, Columbia/FGV Conference in
New York, FGV Direito SP Worshop in Sao Paulo. Errors are mine alone.
1. Henry G. Manne, in a study published in 1966, argued that insider trading
should not be considered illegal, and he pointed out its benefits as being translated into
more efficient markets, as well as in viewing the use of information as an instrument of
company managers’ compensation. (Henry Manne. Insider Trading and the Stock
market. New York: The Free Press, 1966, p. 456-461). For more recent thoughts of this
author, see: Henry Manne. Keynote Address. Journal of Law, Economics & Policy, v. 4,
n. 2, p. 225-232, 2008. For a summary of the debate in the U.S. academia and court
precedents, see: Stephan M. Bainbridge Insider Trading: An Overview, 2000. Available
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=132529>.
2. Utpal Bhattacharya; Hazem Daouk. The World Price of Insider Trading. The
Journal of Finance, v. 5, 1. ed., p. 75-108, 2002. Laura Nyantung Beny. Do Insider
Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence. William Davidson
Institute Working Paper, n. 741, 2005
3. Laura Beny, 2005. Arturo Bris. Do insider trading laws work? European
Financial Management, vol. 11, n. 3, 2005, p. 267-312. Bart Frijns, Aaron Gilbert,
Alizera Tourani-Rad. Do criminal sanctions deter insider trading? The Financial Review
48, 2013, p. 205-232. Bart Frijns, Aaron Gilbert, Alizera Tourani-Rad. Elements of
effective insider trading laws, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443597
4. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002. John C. Coffee Jr. Law and the
Markets: The Impact of Enforcement. Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, n.
304, 2007; Howell Jackson; Mark J. Roe. Public and private enforcement of securities
93
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This Article is a contribution to comparative studies of the
effectiveness of insider trading law. There have been several comparative
studies that assessed enforcement using simplified proxies, such as the
frequency of prosecution,5 as is done in the enforcement index created by
World Bank-funded research studies. These studies have tended to suggest
that emerging countries do not have effective systems for deterring illegal
trading, either because of weakness in rules and sanctions, deficiencies in
enforcement, or both. For example, there are generic claims, such as
“developed countries have a better record of prosecution than emerging
markets;”6 “like 70% of emerging markets who have the insider trading
law, did not enforce the law” 7 or “[i]n Latin and Asian countries, insider
trading scandals usually display linkages to political power.”8
While such studies often use very simplified—and possibly
misleading—metrics, others dig more deeply into system operations
describing enforcement outcomes in detail and providing more nuanced
insights. Some papers organize results by comparing different countries,9
and others describe countries in isolation.10 With the exception of China,
however, most of these more detailed and useful studies deal with
developed countries.11
This Article seeks to fill that gap through a detailed study about the
enforcement of insider trading laws in Brazil. The country is one of the
world’s ten largest economies. It has a very large and active capital market
with 328public companies in the stock market and USD 1, 232 million in
market value.12 Yet, in the international debate about insider trading law,
very little is known about Brazil except for a few poorly documented
laws: Resource-based evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 93, n. 2, p. 207-238,
2009.
5. E.g. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002.
6. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002, p. 104;
7. Utpal Bhattacharya; Hazem Daouk, When no law is better than a good law,
Review of Finance (2009) 13, p. 578
8. Arturo Bris, 2005, p. 280.
9. Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan, Jasper Hedges, Ian Ramsay, Sanctions
imposed for insider trading in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States: An empirical study, Research
Working Paper Series, Center for International Finance and Regulation – CIFR, June
2016, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817172
10. Hui Huang. The regulation of insider trading in China: law and enforcement,
2013, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378842
11. No reference was found on more detailed studies with information on India,
Russia, and Brazil.
12. See the B3 (the current only Stock Exchange in Brazil) data in 12/19/2019,
available at: http://www.b3.com.br/pt_br/market-data-e-indices/servicos-dedados/market-data/consultas/mercado-a-vista/valor-de-mercado-das-empresaslistadas/bolsa-de-valores/
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studies offering a negative understanding of the Brazilian insider trading
enforcement system.13 This Article shows that the reality is different and
fills a gap of knowledge about Brazil’s role in the battle against insider
trading. Through empirical research on the enforcement institutions´
outcomes, it is possible to show the complexity and the relative
effectiveness of the Brazilian system. The data gathered suggests that,
regarding its enforcement regime, Brazil has advanced far beyond those
countries that have formal insider trading laws but fails to enforce them.14
Brazilian insider trading law goes back to 1976, following the
postulate of equity of treatment for all investors in stock market. While the
substantial law goes back decades, it is in recent years that enforcement has
stepped up and additional sanctions have been added. In 2001, criminal
sanctions were enacted for those required to keep information confidential,
imposing a fine of up to three times the amount earned and a prison
sentence. In 2017, all kinds of trading based on material, nonpublic
information was criminalized.15
In conducting the study of enforcement, in addition to considering
the possibility of prosecution, we looked at institutional design and the
various legal tools used by the enforcers. The study looked at the choice of
regulatory tools and at the cooperation between institutions which may
affect effectiveness, mainly on a criminal level. This broad description
reveals mechanisms of the current system and points to challenging features
that need specific enhancements in order to further improve enforcement.16

13. James H. Thompson, A Global Comparison of insider trading regulations,
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2013, vol. 3, N.1, available
at: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijafr/article/viewFile/3269/2976
(arguing that “Insider trading is currently in Brazil and will likely continue until the
government steps up its enforcement activities”); Otavio R. de Medeiros, Insider trading
in the Brazilian Stock Market, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457444 (concluding that “although
an institutional framework exists in Brazil to fight insider-trading practices in the stock
market, the actual success and willingness of the authorities with respects to this form of
corruption is inefficient”).
14. See Utpal Bhattaharya, Hazem Daouk, 2009.. Based on their empirical
research, the authors presented data about countries that have insider trading rules, but do
not enforce them.
15. It is worth noting that in Brazil administrative punishment and criminal
prosecution can coexist.
16. For other securities regulation enforcement perspective, for example, there
is the private or public enforcement debate. For this perspective, see, e.g.: LaPorta,
Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. “What Works in
Securities Laws?” Journal of Finance 61 (1): 1-32. (defending the private enforcement as
most efficient); Jackson, Howell Edmunds and Roe, Mark J., Public and Private
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (March 16, 2009). Journal of
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This Article sheds light on the importance of understanding the alternative
regulation tools available to a single institution, as well as the coordination,
competition, or conflict among the various institutions that participate in
the enforcement system.
Following this Introduction, the remainder of the Article is divided
into five sections. The first and second sections describe the Brazilian
insider trading laws and the regulatory framework. The third section
presents enforcement empirical data. The fourth section consolidates and
provides a critical assessment of the main findings. Finally, a conclusion is
presented.
II. BRAZILIAN INSIDER TRADING LAWS
The objective of the Brazilian insider trading regulation is to
guarantee a fair market with the equitable treatment of investors.17 For this
purpose, since 1976, the legal system has prohibited trade based on
material, nonpublic information. 18
The Corporation Law proscribed the use of information that has not
yet been revealed to the market. In origin, this legal provision was only
applicable to directors and officers and outlined their duty of loyalty and,
more specifically, their duty to maintain the integrity of any information
not yet disclosed.19 The law expressly granted the right of the investor to be
Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 93, 2009 (criticizing the idea that private enforcing is
necessarily more efficient than public enforcement).
17. Nelson Eizirik, Insider trading in Brazil: Recent developments,
https://www.pifsinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Latin-America-2008Symposium.pdf.
18. The first rule-prohibiting insider trading dates to 1965, in the article 3o. n. X
of Law 4,728/1965 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L4728.htm] . However,
there was no explicit outlawing of the use of nonpublic information. This rule only
delineated the jurisdiction of the capital market regulator, which was the Central Bank.
For a critical position on this rule, see Luís Gastão Paes de Barros Leães, Mercado de
Capitais e “insider trading”, São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1982, p. 173 (arguing that
not even the elements of insider trading were defined by the law); Fábio Konder
Comparato, ‘Insider trading:’ sugestões para uma moralização do nosso mercado de
capitais, Revista de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e Finaceiro, n. 2, 1971, p.
46-47.
19. According to Article 155, § 1 of the Law 6, 404/1976, the directors and
officers of a publicly traded company are also responsible for maintaining the integrity of
any piece of information not yet disclosed to the public that was obtained due to the
individual’s position within the company and with the significance to influence the
company’s share value. It is illegal for such individual to use such information to gain
any advantage via the purchase or sale of company stocks. Under Article 155, § 2 of the
Law 6,404/1976, the manager must ensure his or her subordinates, or third parties linked
to them through a relationship of trust, neither divulge nor use privileged information.
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compensated by directors or managers who violated the disclosure rules,
either by providing false information, not maintaining confidentiality, or
using privileged information for his or her own benefit.20
The prohibition of trading on material, nonpublic information has
been extended to other market players through administrative regulation. In
1979, CVM enacted an administrative provision forbidding non-equitable
practices and acts that yield “a treatment to any of the parties in securities
transaction, directly or indirectly, effectively or potentially, that puts that
party in an unequal position with respect to the remaining participants of
the transaction.”21 With this rule as a baseline, the CVM began to punish
people, beyond just director and managers, for the use of material,
nonpublic information.22
Later in 1984, and also by means of a CVM administrative provision
related to the obligation to disclose material facts, there was a broader rule
forbidding trade based on nonpublic information by people other than
directors and managers.23 In addition, controlling shareholders were
included on the list of people forbidden to trade based on nonpublic
information.24 The prohibition was extended in order to reach all of those
who had directly accessed information due to their professional position,
function, or in collaboration with the corporation, even if indirectly.25
The 2001 Capital Market Law reform brought other references to
the use of material, nonpublic information. The legal prerogatives of the
regulator were strengthened, and the CVM was expressively assigned the
duty of protecting investors against the use of nonpublic information.26 This
20. Article 156, § 3, of Law 6,404/1976 states that, “Any person harmed by the
purchase or sale of shares determined illegal by paragraphs 1 and 2 have the right to be
compensated by the guilty party for all losses.”
21. CVM Rule 08/1979, II, d.
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst008.html]
22. Alexandre Pinheiro dos Santos, Fábio Medina Osório, Julya Sotto Mayor
Wellisch, Mercado de capitais. Regime Sancionador, São Paulo, Saraiva, 2012, p. 127;
Nelson Eizirik, A Instrução CVM 31/84 e a regulamentação do ‘insider trading’, Revista
de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e Financeiro, n. 55, 1984 p. 170-175. All
authors describing the use of CVM Rule 08/1979 in insider trading cases.
23. Regarding CVM Rule 31/1984
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst031.html], in addition to the CVM
Explanatory Note 28/1984 [http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/legislacao/notasexplicativas/anexos/nota028.pdf], see Nelson Eizirik, A Instrução CVM 31/84 e a
regulamentação do ‘insider trading’, Revista de Direito Mercantil, , Industrial,
Econômico e Financeiro n. 55, 1984, p. 170-175.
24. CVM Rule 31/1984, Articles 9 and 10.
25. CVM Rule 31/1984, Articles 10 and 11.
26. Article 155, § 4, of Law 6,404/1976 (Corporation Law), as included in the
Law 10,303/2001 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/LEIS_2001/L10303.htm].
This comes via section sub-item c of item IV in Article 4 of the Law 6,385/1976, which
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power was also reinforced by a provision that made the use of nonpublic
information illegal by any person that had access to it, not just director,
managers and shareholders.27 In the following year, the CVM edited a
provision to strengthen compliance regarding the prohibition of using
material, nonpublic information. This provision outlawed trading by
insiders both before and after announcement of material information for the
market (fato relavante). 28
In 2001, amid a movement to improve investor protection in the
Brazilian capital markets, insider trading was criminalized for people who
were charged with the obligation of maintaining informational secrecy (the
duty of confidentiality). In 2017, the criminal consequences were extended
to any person undertaking transactions based on material, nonpublic
information. 29 Disclosure of confidential information by those with access
to it by virtue of their professional position has also been criminalized. 30
The criminal penalty established is a one to five year prison term and a fine
of up to three times the amount resulting from the undue advantage that
resulted from use of confidential information.31 For those trading with
nonpublic information that is supposed to be kept confidential, like

expressly states that the CVM will be responsible for “(...) IV. protecting shareholders
and investors against: (...) c) the use of relevant information not previously disclosed to
the market.”
27. This comes from Article 155, § 4, Law 6.404, 1976. This rule clarifies the
CVM’s administrative rule already provided in CVM Rule 31/1984.
28. The new rule is as follows: “Art. 13. Before trading company stocks, the
company must reveal any material facts to the company’s transactions.” (CVM Rule
358/2002) [http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst358.html
29. Art. 27-D, Law 6.385/1976
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L6385.htm], as amended by Law
13.506/2017 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato20152018/2017/lei/L13506.htm]: “Art. 27-D. Using any relevant non-disclosed information
that may result, to oneself or to a third party, in unfair advantage, by trading securities on
one’s or on third party’s behalf.”
30. Art. 27-D, § 1o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017: “Art.
27-D § 1o. Those who disclose any confidential information related to a material fact to
which this person has had access due to their job or position in an issuing company or by
virtue of a commercial or professional relationship or for having a trusting relationship
with the issuing company are subject to the same penalty.”
31. Law 6, 385/1976, as amended by Law 10, 303/2001, article 27-D.
Criminalization in the terms of article 27-D, of Law 6,385/1976, in accordance with the
Law 10, 303/2001, which includes the following provision: “Art. 27-D. Using relevant
information not previously disclosed to the market, of which the parties in question are
aware and which they were required to maintain secrecy, and which they were in a
position to use for their own advantage or for the advantage of others through the
negotiation of securities. The penalty will include between 1 to 5 years of imprisonment
and a fine of up to 3 times to value illegal obtained from the transaction.”
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shareholders, directors and managers, the penalty is increased by 1/3 (one
third).32
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO ENFORCE BRAZILIAN INSIDER
TRADING LAWS
Enforcement of the insider trading laws may take place at the
administrative, civil or criminal levels, and may involve different
institutions using different legal tools.
A. Administrative Level
The CVM 33 is the Brazilian securities market regulator and a key
enforcing institution of insider trading laws. In order to deal with the use of
nonpublic information, the CVM has the duties to monitor the market and,
if suspected insider trading practices are found, to institute a punitive
administrative sanctioning proceeding (processo administrativo
sancionador) to investigate illegal practices in the securities market. At the
end, it must decide whether to punish or acquit the defendants.
Punishment may include warning, fine, suspension, temporary
disqualification to hold positions in publicly traded corporations or
intermediaries, suspension or revocation of the authorization to perform any
activity on such market, or prohibition to transect directly or indirectly in
the market.34 In a single case, these penalties can be in isolation or
cumulatively. To set the fine cap, the law has four yardsticks: (1) fifty
million Brazilian reais,35 (2) double the amount of the irregular transaction,
(3) three times the amount of the economic advantage gained or loss
avoided due to the violation, or (4) double the investors’ damage. 36 Since
32. Art. 27-D, § 2o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017. “Art.
27-D (…) §2o.: The penalty is increased by 1/3 (one third) if the agent commits the
crime set out in the heading of this article using any relevant information they have had
access to but was supposed to keep it confidential.”
33. CVM was established by Law 6,385/1976 as the specialized authority
regulating the securities market, thus replacing the Central Bank of Brazil. The laws
10,303/2001
and
10,411/2002
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/2002/L10411.htm]
delegated
further
administrative power to the CVM as a regulatory and supervisory agency with jurisdiction
over the securities market, similar to the regulatory agencies created during the 1990s’ in
Brazil.
34. Art. 11, Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2017/lei/L13506.htm].
35. This amount is equal to approximately USD 13,600,000 (1 USD = BRL 3.97
as of 05/30/19 according to Brazilian Central Bank).
36. Art. 11, § 1o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017.
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2017, with the reform of the capital market law, the CVM can still enter
into leniency agreements (acordo de leniência) with regulated parties to
seek reduction of penalties.
The punitive decision of the CVM may be made more severe,
attenuated, or ruled to be unenforceable by the second level administrative
court (Conselho de Recursos do Sistema Financeiro Nacional) (“CRSFN”).
The CRSFN was created in 1985 and is linked to the Ministry of Finance.37
It is an institution consisting of eight members, half of whom are chosen by
government authorities and half by the private sector.38 CRSFN decisions
can still be re-examined by courts.
At the administrative level, the regulated parties investigated for
wrongdoing are allowed to enter into a settlement (termo de compromisso)
with the CVM.39 Through this regulatory tool, in a consensual way, the
CVM suspends the administrative sanctioning proceeding. In turn, the
regulated party is required to end the investigated practice and correct any
irregularities in addition to providing compensation for incurred injuries.
This legal tool is a “neither-admit-nor deny” instrument.40 It is important to
highlight that settlements do not rule out the possibility for a criminal case.
The decision to reach a settlement is made by the CVM “at its sole
discretion, if the public interest allows.”41 The law does not set strict
parameters for the decision. It only establishes that the “opportunity and
convenience of the settlement and appropriateness of the proposal”42 should
be assessed, and the nature and gravity of the violations, the records of the
accused, and the effective possibility of punishment in the actual case
should be considered.43 There is neither review by the courts in this
administrative decision, nor participation by the CRSFN.
37. CRSFN was created by Decree 19,152/1985
[http://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1980-1989/D91152.htm]. For empirical analysis
of the CRSFN’s activity regarding capital market issues, see Juliana Bonocorsi de Palma,
Viviane Muller Prado, Estudos avançados de mercado de capitais. Conselho de Recurso
do Sistema Financeiro Nacional, São Paulo, Elsevier, 2014.
38. The Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the CVM) and half who are
appointed by market entities (ANBIMA- Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets
Association, FEBRABAN – Brazilian Banks Association, ANCORD – Brazilian Broker
Association, and ABRASCA – Public Companies Association).
39. Article 11, §§ 5 to 8, of the Law 6,385/1976, as writing in Law 9, 457/1997
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9457.htm].
40. Article 11, § 6 and Article 4, CVM Decision (Deliberação) 390, 2001
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/deliberacoes/deli0300/deli390.html].
41. Expressions used in Article 11, § 5, Law 6, 385/1976, as amended by Law
9,457/1997.
42. Article 8, CVM Decision 390/2001, as amended by CVM Decision 486,
2005. [http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/deliberacoes/deli0400/deli486.html]
43. Article 9, CVM Decision 390/2001, as amended by CVM Decision 486,
2005.
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B. Criminal Level
For criminal consequences, the CVM is obliged to communicate the
insider trading case to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério
Público Federal) (“MPF”) at the very beginning of the punitive
administrative proceeding or after a settlement decision. The public
prosecutors have two options: file a criminal lawsuit or dismiss the case if
there is not sufficient evidence of a crime wrongdoing. In the first option,
criminal courts thus have the final decision. In the second, courts must agree
with the dismissal. In the criminal judicial sphere, the CVM can only act
jointly with the MPF assisting it. The market regulator has no standing to
sue in the criminal sphere.
C. Civil Level
Insider trading has potential liability consequences at the civil level.
A lawsuit can be filed in order to compensate for losses caused by the use
of material, nonpublic information to the market or to individual investors.
The compensation can be sought individually or collectively through
lawsuits brought by those who have been harmed.
The collective instrument to seek compensation is a public-interest
civil lawsuit (Ação Civil Pública) filed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office
and/or by the CVM. Since 1989, the law has expressly provided legal
standing to the public prosecutor, by means of a CVM decision or based on
its own prerogative, to pursue judicial measures in order to avoid losses or
obtain compensations for losses to protect investors.
It is possible to consensually end the litigation in a public-interest
civil lawsuit by signing another kind of settlement, a consent decree (Termo
de compromisso e ajustamento de conduta) (“TAC”). The judiciary must
approve this decision. However, as in the case of a settlement, criminal
charges may still be brought against the defendant.44 Signing the settlement
or consent decree does not imply a confession per se, nor an explicit
recognition of the unlawful act.

44. Article 5, § 6., of the Law 7,347/1985 (Public Civil Action Law)
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L7347orig.htm], according to the Law
8,078/1990 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L8078.htm]; Article art. 11, § 5
of Law 6,385/1976; Article 7, CVM Decision 390, 2001; and Article 5, § 6. of Law
7,347/1985.
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D. The Regulatory Enforcement Framework
The following table (Table 1) summarizes the instruments and
institutions that may participate in the enforcement system regarding the
prohibition of trading based on material, nonpublic information in the
Brazilian capital market.
Table 01. Institutions and Regulatory Tools of Insider Trading
Laws Enforcement

Criminal Civil liability

Administrative

Le
vel

Regulatory
tools
Punitive
administrati
ve
proceeding

Settlement

Leniency
Agreement
Publicinterest civil
lawsuit
Consent
decree
Individual
or collective
civil lawsuit
Criminal
lawsuit

Generated by

Decision

Goal/Effect

CVM

CVM/CRSF
N/
Courts

Administrative
punishment

Regulated party

CVM

Obligation to
payment of value,
correct
wrongdoing
practices, and
indemnification

Regulated party

CVM

Reduce penalties

Public
Prosecutors´
Office/CVM
Regulated
party/ Public
Prosecutors´
Office /CVM
Investor or
association of
investors
Federal Public
Prosecutor’s
Office

Courts
CVM/ Public
Prosecutors´
Office/
Courts
Courts

Courts

Payment of
compensation for
losses
Payment of
compensation
and/or exit the
market position
Payment of
compensation for
losses
Criminal
punishment
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW IN NUMBERS FROM 2008 TO
2018
A. Research Methodology
The empirical data gathering mechanisms come from a variety of
sources and follow a few routines which are described above. For all the
researched legal institutions (CVM, CRSFN, Courts), we were comfortable
to use keywords as regular expressions in a python environment. The
patterns
we
used
were:
'infor.{,10}privi.*?\W',
'insider',
'infor.{,8}relev.*?\W', 'oscila.{,8}at.p.*?\W', '08/79', '31/84', '358/02',
'(fat.{,8}rele.*?)\W' and '\D(155)\D'. When handling judicial decisions, this
was not possible, mainly due to the large quantity of documents. So, we
used a more traditional approach for the federal courts of the second45 and
third46 regions (Tribunais Federais da Segunda e Terceira Região). On
those websites and for criminal purpose, we used the keywords "penal" e
"insider trading", "art. 27-D" and "penal" e "informação privilegiada".
To find CVM decisions on punitive administrative proceedings, the
first route possible is the search tool presented on their website, which is
intended to apply criteria in documents within the procedures.47 However,
this tool does not allow for a deep search, and its parameters are very
limited. Our solution was to map the procedures through another part of the
website.48 After inserting all the possible combinations for the parameters
(around 240,000), we ended up with all the existing proceedings, along with
a brief description of its object, purpose, and acts. Finally, we ran the abovementioned keywords to find possible matches, and then we manually read
the decisions.
We found a total of 401 CVM rulings and selected 65 specific cases
about insider trading wrongdoing in the period of 2008-2018. The data was
organized with the following categories of information: (i) number of cases
per year; (ii) number of defendants per year; (iii) CVM final ruling (number
of defendants punished and number of defendants acquitted per year); (iv)
defendant’s position (internal, external, or market agent); (v) type of
material, nonpublic information (merger and acquisitions transactions,
45. Link used for the research:
http://www10.trf2.jus.br/consultas/?entqr=3&lr=lang_pt&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF8&adv=1&ulang=&access=p&entqrm=0&wc=200&wc_mc=0&ud=1&filter=0&getfield
s=*&q=&client=v2_index&proxystylesheet=v2_index&site=v2_jurisprudencia&sort=da
te:D:S:d1&base=JP-TRF
46. Link used for the research: http://web.trf3.jus.br/base-textual
47. Link used for the research:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/sancionadores/index.html
48. Link used for the research: http://sistemas.cvm.gov.br/?PAS
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change in the corporation control, financial information, or corporate
business information); (v) type of CVM penalty (fine, warning, or
suspension; (vi) ratio between profit based on the use of insider information
and the amount of the fine.
For the decisions on CVM’s settlement decisions (Termos de
Compromisso), the website offered similar problems regarding text
filtering.49 Here, we collected all the decisions by searching for all the
possible dates between 2008 and 2018. Afterward, we ran all the abovementioned keywords and read the matching results. We found a total of 507
CVM settlement decisions and selected only 57 specific cases about insider
trading wrongdoing. The data was organized with the following categories
of information: (i) number of settlement proposals and cases per year; (ii)
number of accepted settlement proposal per year; (iii) number of denied
settlement proposal per year; and (iv) ratio between suspected profit based
on the use of insider information and the amount of the pecuniary obligation
on the settlement.
Regarding the CRSFN’s decisions, we faced a different problem:
this institution deals with appeals from different administrative branches,
such as the Brazilian Central Bank, CVM, money laundering control, and
insurance regulator. However, we were only interested in appeals facing
CVM decisions. Our solution was to filter in the website50 for the term
“CVM.” This resulted in approximately 1,000 decisions. Afterward, we ran
keywords and read the matching results. We found a total of 228 CRSFN
judgments and selected 37. The data was organized with the following
categories of information: (i) number of cases per year; (ii) CRSFN’s
decision to review or uphold the CVM’s ruling; and (iii) if CRSFN’s
decision review the ruling resulted in a better or worse outcome for the
defendant.
B. Enforcement in Numbers: An Overview
In Brazil, from 2008 to 2018, 51 there were 54 punitive
administrative cases ruled on by the CVM related to insider trading. These
49. Link used for the research: http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/index.html
50. Link used for the research:
https://www.bcb.gov.br/crsfn/ementasacordaos.html
51. Por a previous time, see Nora Rachman, O princípio do full disclosure no
mercado de capitais, 1999 (University of São Paulo’s master dissertation not published).
According to Nora Rachman’s research project, which considers the period between
1976 and 1988, the administrative process of penalizing after insider trading became
more constant at the CVM. There was a total of “29 administrative inquiries into the
subject of insider trading, aiming at investigating the occurrence of irregularities and
applying sanctions, having acquitted the defendant in 10 cases and finding substantial
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cases involved 158 defendants and resulted mostly in fines corresponding
in two or three times the value of profit from the transaction. During the
same period, there were 42 settlement agreements signed involving 72
persons and three consent decrees involving three persons. Most of the
settlements and consent decrees establish a payment of an amount usually
equal to two or three times the gain value. At the criminal level, there were
only two final court decisions, both involving previous cases tried by the
CVM, but just one imprisonment (later replaced by community service),
along with a fine of three times the amount of the profit and a ban on future
participation in trading in the securities market.
The table below (Table 2) shows the big picture of the insider
trading enforcement system outcome.
Table 02. Insider trading laws enforcement in numbers (2008 2018)

Level

Regulatory
tools

Civil
Administrative
liability

Punitive
administrative
proceeding

Settlement

Leniency
Agreement

Number of
Number
defendants
of cases
or parties

54

57

158

112

Result

Most
common
sanction or
consequences

66
punishments Fine (two or
three times
the profits)
50
individual
settlements

Payment of
two or three
times the
profits

0
0

Public-interest
0
civil lawsuit

0

0

0

-

evidence of insider trading in the remaining 19.” From the 19 adjudicated cases, 19 of the
indicted parties were acquitted and 23 convicted. The punishments handed out included
fines (11 indicted), warnings (9), and suspension (3). It is interesting to note that the
1990s were a period in which few investigations into illicit activities were initiated, with
only five insider trading cases adjudicated in a 10-year period.
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3 individual
consent
decrees

Consent
decree

3

3

Individual or
collective
civil lawsuit

0

0

0
-

Criminal

01 criminal
punishment
Criminal
lawsuit

Payment of
three times
the profits and
prohibition to
be on the
market player
for 3 years

2

9

Fine (three
times the gain
value),
community
service, and
trading
prohibition

C. Enforcement in Detail
1. Administrative Level
a) Data on Punitive Administrative Proceedings (Processo Administrativo
Sancionador)
From the outset, pursuing punitive action in cases of insider trading
was on the CVM’s enforcement agenda. It is worth noting that the first CVM
trial was in 1978 and involved punishment for the use of material, nonpublic
information. 52 From 2008 to 2018, the CVM ruled on 54 administrative
cases related to insider trading. From 2010 on, the number of cases ranged
from three to ten per year (Graph 01). This piece of information suggests that
the illegal use of material, nonpublic information is a constant focus of the
CVM’s enforcement, but varies over the years.

52. To access the CVM’s decision on the SERVIX case, see Inquéritos
Administrativos julgados pela CVM, vol. 1, 1979, p. 11-43.
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Graph 01 – Punishment and acquittal of insider trading defendants
and cases tried by CVM (per year) – (2008-2018)

The 54 cases involved 158 defendants. Regarding punishments, 66
defendants were convicted, and 92 were acquitted at the administrative
level. The number of cases and convicted parties vary over the year. In 2008
and in 2012, respectively, the four and five cases judged resulted in 22
defendants punished each year. But, in 2017, only five defendants were
punished in ten cases. A possible explanation of the change in numbers is,
not that CVM was lenient in punishing suspicious acts regarding the use of
nonpublic information but, that there were some errors in the monitoring of
the market, or there were decisions made in going further with difficult or
“bad” cases.
As the Brazilian law includes anyone using nonpublic information
as an illegal transaction, the position of those defendants, as well as whether
they have been convicted or acquitted, is a relevant piece of information to
assess the effectiveness of the insider trading laws in all extensions. To
collect this information properly, the research used three categories to
classify the defendants: internal, external, and market agents. Internal
includes those who have a direct and permanent link with the issuer,
including shareholders, board of directors members, managers, and
employees. External are those who have a direct link with the issuer through
their professional position and access to the material and confidential
information, such as lawyers or financial agents that work as consultants on
a merger or an acquisition transaction. The market group is residual and
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includes those who are neither internal nor external, such as individual
investors, relatives of internal agents, investment funds, and brokers.
Using this classification of defendants, the result was: 79 internal,
three external, and 74 market agents and investors.53 This data deserves two
comments. First, the extension of the rule regarding the use of nonpublic
information to include people beyond shareholders, directors, and managers
is covered by the CVM’s enforcement. 54 Second, knowing that the market
intermediaries and investors represented almost 50% of all of defendants
causes us to reflect on the instruments capable of mitigating the effects of
information leaking outside of the issuing company. In addition, it is
relevant to cross-reference the positions of the defendants with the
judgement decisions in order to assess the extent of effective enforcement,
mainly for those other than corporation agents. This information can be
easily visualized in the graph (Graph 02) below.
Graph 02 - Punishment and acquittal and defendant positions in CVM
cases (2008-2018)

53. For another way of classifying primary and secondary actors see: Nelson
Eizirik, Insider trading in Brazil: Recent developments,
https://www.pifsinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Latin-America-2008Symposium.pdf
54. CVM Rule 08, 1979, changed by CVM Rule 31, 1984; Article 155, § 4, Law
6,404/1976.
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This data mainly points out the high number of punishments of
market investors, despite the theoretical difficulty in demonstrating that the
origin of a trade resulted directly from access and use of nonpublic
information. Another piece of relevant information is related to internal
defendants: shareholders were the most punished actor in this category.
This result points to a strong hypothesis of insider trading as a private
benefit of controlling positions that needs to be tested. Board of directors’
members and managers (agents very close to the confidential information)
have been frequently indicted, but not necessarily punished.
To better assess the Brazilian insider trading law enforcement,
knowing what kind of material, nonpublic information gives rise to an
insider trading case is important. The results reveal that a large amount of
the information involves mergers and acquisitions transitions (27 cases),
mainly changes in corporate control. Also, financial information (15 cases)
and information about corporate business (10 cases) gives rise to insider
trading cases. A small part is private decision information (two cases).
Another relevant piece of data is the type of penalty in CVM rulings.
The research reveals that a fine is the most common penalty used by the
regulator, representing almost 95% of the penalties, followed by, in small
number, warnings and suspensions. For 47 of the CVM rulings that the
defendant was punished with a fine, the profit or loss avoided was expressly
mentioned to set the amount of the pecuniary sanction. The CVM tends to
calculate its fines by multiplying the profit earned or the loss avoided by
either two or three times the amount as shown in the table below (Table 03).
Table 03. Ratio between the profit/loss avoided and the amount of the fine
(2008-2018)
Pecuniary penalty value criterion
Twice the value of the profit
Three times the value of the profit
One and a half times the value of the profit
Once the value of the profit
Maximum standard of BRL 500,000
Total

Times
applied
22
13
8
2
2
47

It is worth noting that the vast majority of insider trading cases ruled
on by the CVM do not include large volumes of gains. As shown in the
chart below, the research results suggest that the transactions analyzed by
the CVM do not involve huge monetary gains, most being less than USD
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500,000.55 There were only a few cases involving gains above USD 2
million, and in half of them, the defendants were acquitted.
Graph 03. Volume of gain or loss avoided in insider cases X acquitted or
punished defendants (2008-2018)

Considering that the CVM’s punishment decisions can be reviewed
by the CRSFN, which is the second administrative instance, it is worth
determining whether the CVM’s decisions to punish the use of insider
trading are upheld or reviewed by the CRSFN. See Table 04 below.
Table 04: CRSFN decisions to uphold or review CVM rulings (20082018)
Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Individual
judged
57
5
4
0
25
3
13
14

Upheld

Reviewed

55
4
4
0
22
3
13
5

2
1
0
0
3
0
0
9

55. To convert BRL in USD, see:
https://www.bcb.gov.br/estabilidadefinanceira/historicocotacoes.
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2018
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13
29
18
181

12
20
15
153

111

1
9
3
28

According to the research findings in the same period, 2008 to 2018,
the CRSFN decided 37 cases related to insider trading wrongdoing
involving 281 individuals. The CRSFN upheld the CVM’s decision for 153
individuals and reviewed for just 28. For 11 individuals, the CRSFN
reviewed the case and increased the fine amount. For the others 17
individuals, the CRSFN reversed the CVM’s judgment either by acquitting
the convicted defendants or decreasing the fine.
b) Data on Settlements (Termo de Compromisso)
The following data was found regarding the use of settlements in
cases of insider trading from 2008 to 2018. See Graph 04 below.
Graph 04 – Total number of proposals for settlements related to insider
trading accepted and rejected by the CVM (per year) – (2008-2018)

This data suggests that proposals for settlements in cases of insider
trading constantly appear for the CVM’s consideration, and the rate of
acceptance varies. From 2008 to 2018, 57 cases involving 112 persons
(individual and legal persons) with suspicions of insider trading were
considered by the CVM for a settlement decision. The regulator accepted
50 and denied 62 persons suspected of trading based on material, nonpublic
information.
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All settlement proposals involved an obligation of a pecuniary
amount to be payed to the government. When the settlement delineated how
much was gained in the transaction or how much loss was avoided, the
method used to establish the value of the obligation, with few exceptions,
was to double the measured benefit. The fine criteria and whether the
proposal was accepted or denied is shown in the table below (Table 05).
Table 05. Ratio between the profit/loss avoided and the amount of the
pecuniary obligation (2008-2018)
Proposed value criterion
No relation with the conduct
Minimum standard of BRL 150,000
Once the value of the profit
Twice the value of the profit
Three times the value of the profit
Other types of criteria related to the
conduct
Total

Accepted
24
11
10
10
2

Denied
10
12
4
13
8

5
62

3
50

The argument may be put forward that, according to the law, the
value in question is not the only criteria for making a decision regarding
whether the use of a settlement is convenient and opportune. However, the
basis of the regulator’s decision whether to accept a settlement or not often
revolves around whether the “value being offered is sufficient to dissuade
similar actions by the accused and by third parties,” “if the value being
offered is adequate,” and “if the proposal is proportional to the graveness
of the wrongdoing in question.” Besides these bases, the final decision is
often supported by words such as “convenient and opportune” and “a win
for the public administration that was quickly processed with minimum
cost.” This vague reasoning creates doubts as to the real causes behind these
decisions and opens the possibility for inequity in the treatment of regulated
parties.
2. Criminal Level
Insider trading was criminalized in 2001,56 but the first criminal
case was brought just in 2009. The initiative can be explained as the result
56. With the amendment of Law 6,385/1976 for the Law 10,303/2001 (which
including the addition of Article 27-D).
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of the signing in 2008 of a cooperation agreement between the CVM and
the Federal Public Prosecutor in which the two institutions agreed to
exchange information and collaborate in response to crimes against the
capital market.
Until 2018, the Brazilian enforcement system had only produced
two final decisions on the criminal level involving insider trading cases.
The first criminal case was a transaction in which Sadia launched an offer
for a voluntary acquisition of Perdigão’s stocks in the market.57 Sadia’s
managers traded Perdigão’s American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) using information that had yet to be
disclosed to the market. The case was first investigated by the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), which accused the Investor Relationship
Officer, a member of the board of directors, and an employee at the
financial institution that had participated in the offer (ABN Amron) of
insider trading. In 2007, the parties under investigation arrived at a
cooperation agreement with the SEC which barred them from participating
in market activities for a certain period of time and required them to pay a
fine.
The case was also analyzed in the administrative sphere by the
CVM which decided to suspend the individuals from holding a position in
publicly traded companies58. This was also the first case in which the
defendant was prosecuted criminally for insider trading. In 2008, the CVM
communicated the incident to the Federal Public Prosecutor which filed the
case in 2009. One defendant was indeed found guilty in the higher court
(Superior Tribunal de Justiça), with the conviction including a fine and
suspension from all trading activities in 2016. 59 The other indicted party’s
investigation ended with a settlement.
The second case involved Randon S.A., a company in the cargo
transportation field. 60 The controlling shareholder, his family (wife and
son), and some other managers traded shares two months before the
announcement of a new partner in August 2002, an American company
57. S.T.J. Recurso Especial n. 1.569.171. São Paulo, Relator: Min. Gurgel de
Faria, 16/02/2016, R.T. 967, p. 477
58. C.V.M., Processo Administrativo Sancionador SP n. 2007/0117, Relator:
Dir. Eli Loria, 26/02/2008, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/sancionadores/sancionador/anexos/2008/20080
226_PAS_SP20070117.pdf ; C.V.M. Processo Administrativo Sancionador n.
2007/0118, Relator: Dir. Marcos Barbosa Pinto, 26/02/2008, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/sancionadores/sancionador/anexos/2008/20080
226_PAS_SP20070118.pdf
59. S.T.J. Recurso Especial n. 1.569.171. São Paulo, Relator: Min. Gurgel de
Faria, 16/02/2016, R.T. 967, p. 477
60. Justiça Federal, 6ª Vara Criminal - São Paulo. Ação Penal nº 123 000947442.2009.4.03.6181,17/12/2012, D.O. 10/01/2013.
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named ArvinMerit. During the interim period, the company’s stock value
increased by 120%. The lawsuit filed by the Federal Public Prosecutor of
Rio Grande do Sul against six accused agents occurred at the beginning of
2010. After discussions regarding jurisdiction, the case ended up in the
Criminal Branch of Sao Paulo, which specializes in financial crimes and
money laundering.61 In July 2012, the process was suspended when the
Federal Public Prosecutor accepted a settlement in which the accused
agents paid individual fines to the CVM, in addition to completing
community service and making an appearance in front of the court. For two
of the accused agents, the penalty was diminished due to age.
In the two criminal processes, the CVM appears as an assistant party
to the denouncement. As the CVM and the Federal Public Prosecutor have
said, these cases are the “result of an effort for integrated work between the
attorney’s office and the CVM, which have acted together to inhibit and
combat illicit practices in the capital market.”
3. Civil Liability Sphere
The Corporation Law included a direct reference to the right of
investors to seek compensation from the directors and managers that trade
on nondisclosed information, in addition to the possibility of applying the
general rule of civil liability embodied in the Civil Code. Just a few cases
in which an investor sought compensation for losses due to insider trading
have been found.
The first case dates to 1977 and is the first insider trading case
judged by the CVM. In that case, a group of investors were seeking
indemnification after having purchased SERVIX stock during the period
immediately preceding the divulging of facts relevant to the business of the
company.62 Two suits were brought, but neither were successful. The
second case involved ITAP and took place in 1981.63 In that case, the
company’s stocks experienced significant oscillation immediately
preceding the announcement of a buy back scheme in an attempt to go
private. The investors in that case were also unsuccessful.
However, there are some public initiatives in filing public-interest
lawsuits by the public prosecutor and CVM. Since 1990, the public
61. Justiça Federal, 6ª Vara Criminal - São Paulo. Ação Penal nº 123 000947442.2009.4.03.6181, 17/12/2012, D.O. 10/01/2013.
62. T.J.S.P., Ap. Civ. n. 12.145-1, São Paulo Relator: Des. Galvão Coelho,
27/10/1981, Decision published at Revista de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e
Financeiro, n.109, 1998, p. 173-177
63. T.J.R.J., Ap. Civ. 27.882-1, Rio de Janeiro, Relator: Des. Penalva Santos,
27/12/1983, Decision published at Nelson Eizirik, Aurélio W Bastos, Mercado de
Capitais e S.A. – Jurisprudência, CNBV, vol. 1, 1987, p. 295.
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prosecutor and the CVM are authorized to execute consent decrees whereby
they effectively suspend administrative proceedings and civil liability
lawsuits. There is judicial supervision as the courts must approve the
administrative decision.64 So far, the CVM and the federal public
prosecutor have only signed four consent decrees,65 three of which refer to
insider trading cases. In two of the three consent decrees, the criteria to
establish the value of the pecuniary obligation was three times the profit.
The money was paid to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests (Fundo
de Defesa de Direitos Difusos) in both cases, and in one, they agreed to pay
the investors’ counterpart in the operation of buying or selling. In two of
the three, they agreed to non-pecuniary obligations: they were not allowed
to occupy a position of public listed companies or intermediaries in the
capital market for three years.
The first consent decree was signed in 2008 in a case that involved
insider trading and established the possibility of investor compensation.66
The foreign company, Vailly S.A., supposedly bought preferred stock from
Suzano before the announcement of a material fact reporting the transfer of
the company’s controlling block of stock. Vailly S.A. then sold these shares
on the market shortly after the announcement and earned more than 500,000
BRL in the process. The CVM and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed a
public-interest civil action seeking “payment of compensation for the
diffuse damage that it allegedly caused to the securities market and to
society” in an amount three times the net gain that the company derived
from Suzano’s stock sales. They also sought “indemnification for
individual homogeneous damage caused to investors who negotiated with
Vailly before the announcement of the material fact.” A consent decree was
signed to settle the suit and the administrative proceeding, and Vailly was
ordered to pay 2,000,000 BRL. This amount was required to be paid ten
days after the Consent Decree was approved in court.
As stated in the court decision that ratified this agreement, a portion
of the amount (1,425,600 BRL) would be assigned to the Fund for the
Defense of Diffuse Rights (Fundo de Defesa de Dirietos Difusos), and the
remainder (551,450 BRL) would compensate individual investors. The
64. Article 5 o, § 6 o, the Law of Public-Interest Civil Action, as restated by
Law 8,078/1990.
65. For information about the consent decree, see CVM document available at:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/noticias/anexos/2018/20180508_atuacoes_conj
untas_CVM_MPF.pdf Apart from the three mentioned settlements, there are also the
settlements in the case of Aracruz, which were signed in 2012 and 2013. These
established payment to the CVM and to the Fund for Defense of Diffuse Interests.
66. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta Proc. RJ
2007/12231, 04/03/2008, available at:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2008/20080304_R1/20080304_D01.html.
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judge’s reasoning was that the investors should be entitled to the net income
that Vailly earned in the trade carried out based on the insider information.
The amount would be left in a savings account for twelve months. Any
amount not claimed by investors would be credited back to the Fund for the
Defense of Diffuse Interests. The CVM advised the counterparties in the
transactions that the amount was available to be claimed.
The second consent decree involving insider trading was signed in
2009.67 As in the first case, stocks were traded prior to disclosure of a
material fact announcing the transfer of a controlling block of shares and
the subsequent sale by someone that was part of the controlling group as
well as a member of the board of directors of the company Tenda. The buyer
was ordered to resign from the director position for three years and to pay
200,000 BRL to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests.
The third consent decree involving insider trading was signed in
68
2010. As in the cases above, someone (an executive manager of Petrobrás)
traded Ipiranga stock before the announcement of a material fact reporting
the transfer of Ipiranga’s controlling stake to Petrobras, Ultra, and Braskem.
Also, as in the case above, the consent decree suspended the sanctioning
administrative proceeding in the CVM and extinguished the public-interest
civil action and the Innominate Provisional Remedy. The amount, as in the
other case, was three times higher than the earnings derived in the illegal
trading, which totaled 360,202.75 BRL. Since no third parties were
identified, the CVM decided that the money should be paid to the Fund for
the Defense of Diffuse Interests. In addition to the payment, the executive
was prohibited from trading stocks for three years.
It is interesting to observe the use of consent decree concerning
three issues: (1) non-pecuniary obligation, (2) criterion for the
determination of the settlement value, (3) and the recipient of the values
paid in the consent decree.
There are three concerns arising from these cases. The first is related
to the existence of non-pecuniary obligations of the investigated party. Not
being allowed to participate in the market is understood as the most onerous
measure for a capital market participant. However, this measure does not
appear frequently in other regulatory instruments, including administrative
processes and settlements.
The second is related to the criterion used to establish the value of the
67. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta, Proc. RJ
2009/0428, 03/02/2009, available at:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2009/20090203_R1/20090203_D13.html
68. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta, Proc. RJ
2010/0963, 22/06/2010, available at:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2010/20100622_R1/20100622_D01.html
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pecuniary penalty. The criterion was set at three times the gain or the
avoided loss. This is the same criterion that has been utilized in past
sanctioning processes and is the highest possible pecuniary penalty. Indeed,
it is higher than the criterion used in settlements. Since decrees have the
goal of ending a public civil action that aims to compensate the losses
caused, it is interesting to ask how close this value comes to the value used
in pecuniary penalties handed down by the regulator, especially since there
is often little attempt to verify the damage caused to the market or to
investors.
The third observation seems to be the most problematic. It is related
to the recipients of the money paid by the investigated party. In the first
case (Vailly), part of the money went to a Fund for the Defense of Diffuse
Interests and another part went to investors. In both of the following cases
(Tenda and Ipiranga), the money went only to the Fund. Despite
recognizing that the decision to pay the counterpart investors does not seem
to be the most adequate way forward, sending the whole of this money to
the Fund seems to be an even worse solution. This opinion is based on the
fact that there is no benefit accrued to the capital market, especially for the
improvement of oversight or the market supervision to verify the frankness
and strength of the enforcement of the administrative sanction processes.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Local Challenges
The results of the quantitative empirical research suggest that the
CVM is the main enforcer of insider trading laws, since there are more
criminal than civil cases to ban the use of nonpublic information in the
Brazilian stock market. Another research finding is that cases receive very
different responses from the enforcement system, and that is not necessarily
a consequence of burden of proof difficulties, the position of the
defendants, or of any case details. The different consequences might be
related to the tools that were triggered and the enforcer that participated in
the enforcement process.
Recently, comparative literature showed that countries with similar
rules may have different enforcement procedures and outcomes.69 How
about the different results within just one legal system? It is exactly what
we observe in the numbers in Brazil: the existing cases reached different
outcomes depending on which regulatory tools were applied and which
institutions had been proactive in verifying the insider trade.
69. Mathias Siems, The EU Market Abuse Directive: A Case-Based Analysis.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066603
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The vast majority of the insider trading cases have only been
assessed at the administrative level, whether by final decision in a punitive
administrative proceeding or by settlement, mostly resulting in the party
paying two or three times the profit or loss avoided. In just one case with
criminal consequences, the first criminal insider trading case
(Sadia/Perdigão), the manager agreed to pay a certain amount to the U.S.
regulator and, in Brazil, combining administrative and criminal punitive
decisions, was fined six times the gain (three times in the administrative
and three in the criminal). The manager was also prohibited from being
manager in a public corporation.
Another example is a case that ended up at the administrative level
with a consent decree in the Irpiranga/Petrobras case.70 The consent decree
suspended the sanctioning administrative proceeding in the CVM and
extinguished the public-interest civil lawsuit. The manager agreed to pay
three times the earnings derived from the illegal trading and paid it to the
Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests to repair losses by the market. In
addition to the payment, the executive was prohibited from trading stocks
for three years.
These results suggest three preliminary conclusions that could
improve the insider trading ban in a market. First, reforms in the substantial
law, such as criminalizing the insider trading or a higher the penalty, may
be the starting point to combat the use of nonpublic information, but is
never the final stop. Second, the regulatory framework and legal tools are
important features in the enforcement outcomes. Third, analyze deeply the
complexity of the enforcement system is needed to identify the pros and
con of the multi-institutional model.
In order to better understand the local challenges to improve the
effectiveness of insider trading laws, analysis of the various cases may be
divided into two perspectives. The first one is internal and by the CVM.
This perspective sheds light on use, by the regulator, of a range of
regulatory instruments to deal with the trading based in nonpublic
information (namely, the administrative sanctioning process, consent
decrees, settlements, and leniency agreements). The second perspective
analyzes the relationship among the institutions assigned to confront the
unlawful practice of insider trading in the administrative, criminal, and civil
spheres (namely, the CVM, CRSFN, Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office,
and courts).

70. The Board of Commissioners decision is available at:
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2010/20100622_R1/20100622_D01.html
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B. The CVM’s Internal Perspective
In the administrative enforcement system side, the first important
decision is whether the CVM will pursue the punitive route or if the party
will propose a settlement agreement, consent decree, or leniency agreement
to use a consensual process to end the case. By looking at the quantitative
data, it is relevant to understand how and when different legal tools and
regulatory choices are used with regards to the regulator’s perspective or
the regulated party’s interests.
If the number of administrative sanction proceedings adjudicated
for insider trading and the number of settlements in 2008, 2009, 2013, 2016,
and 2017 are compared, we note that the number of proposed settlements is
very near the number of the punitive proceedings. This information
suggests that settlements are relevant to the sanction process for
understanding the CVM’s enforcement. If we compare the value of the
penalty with the pecuniary obligation of the settlement decree, it can be
seen that the instruments are very similar because, in most cases, they
establish the penalty in question as twice the value of the gain attained from
using insider information.
Since the consensual path is followed quite frequently, does this
suggest that the system’s deterrent effect is quite limited? At first glance, it
might seem so. After all, when cases are resolved consensually, there is no
recognition that unlawful practices occurred, and this might seem to
weaken the deterrent effect of the CVM’s actions. However, on close
analysis, it seems that the consensual route may be as effective as the
punitive one once we take into account the actual operation of the punitive
process.
From the regulated party’s perspective, the advantage in signing a
settlement is clear: there is no recognition of guilt nor is there wide exposure
in the media or a possible future conviction that accompanies recognition
of guilt. Such effects could cause an individual’s reputation to take a
significant hit. On the other hand, in a settlement, the payment must be
carried out in ten days, and there is no chance for appeal to the courts.
From the enforcement system point of view, the punitive process is
long and drawn out with uncertain results, while a settlement that includes
a substantial cash payment that is swift and certain. The CVM’s decision to
apply punitive measures can be revised by the CRSFN. This at the least
would extend the date of a final decision. Even after the administrative
appellate court decision, it is possible to challenge its legality in the
judiciary.
However, even before the final judgment, the path to a decision’s
execution can be a long one. Even if the decision of the CVM, CRSFN, or
judiciary is to pursue a punitive action, if there is no voluntary payment by
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the defendant, the value of the penalty will be added to the rolling debt to
be charged through the judgment of a compensation action. This part of the
process does not occur at the CVM, it can take years for the process to be
fully effective.
In this context, having a consensual instrument that obliges the
regulated party to pay in ten days has a certain value that the regulator
understands to be significant and would not seem to be contrary to the
punishment strategy. In contrast, the settlement and consent decree reveal
themselves to be extremely effective instruments to manage the unlawful
practices of the market, including insider trading. In addition, they represent
an alternative to processes with instruction and instrument deficiencies and
would allow for better human and financial resource allocation by the
regulator.71 The legislation grants discretionary power for the regulator to
choose which instruments to use based on opportunity, convenience, and
grounds on public interest. Discretionary power is a valid pathway to give
some sort of flexibility for the public administration.
If only a comparison of the amounts proposed in the settlements is
taken into account, it is not possible to understand the minimum parameters
for using consent decrees and settlements that can compromise the
regulator’s consistent action and, thus, its ability to achieve a deterrence
goal. Other factors may explain the choice of whether or not to establish
settlement agreements. But considering the lack of grounds for the decision,
these other factors are not seen in empirical research based on the available
documents.
However, it was relevant to understand what these terms mean and
concluded that vague terms such as “convenience” and “opportunity” often
appeared in the arguments used to sustain acceptance of a consent decrees.
This is a challenge that the CVM must address in a rational way: it should
better substantiate its decisions. Effective communication keeps away any
suspicions of privilege given to some but not others. This bears on the
guarantee of legal security and sends a message to the market about how
illicit activities are handled.
C. Intra-Institutional Perspective
Beyond the administrative sphere, the legal prohibition of insider
trading can reach the criminal and civil spheres with the participation of the
CVM, Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, and judiciary.

71. Kevin E. Davis, Maira Machado, Guilhermo Jorge. Coordination the
enforcement of anti-corruption law: South American experiences, September, p. 7, 2014
(forthcoming)
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Even though Brazil has a dual enforcement model for punitive
purposes, the criminal sphere seems very ineffective as suggested by the
very low number of criminal cases compared to the administrative level.
The data about the CVM’s punitive activity reveals that there are potential
insider trading acts that should be in the criminal sphere but were punished
at the administrative level instead. As discussed above, there are just two
criminal decisions involving nine persons. There are, however, a few other
cases with no judgment yet. 72 The nonuse of criminal consequences is not
just a characteristic of the Brazilian enforcement system,73 but what feature
of the Brazilian legal system could explain this result?
In Brazil, at the criminal level, the main actor would necessarily be
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the only institution that has standing to file
a criminal lawsuit before courts in cases of insider trading. Knowledge of
the facts depends greatly, but not exclusively, on the CVM’s
communication to the Public Prosecutors Office of its suspicions of use of
nonpublic information. Our empirical research suggests that there is a
stockpile of potential cases judged in the administrative sphere that should
be analyzed in the criminal sphere, but criminal lawsuits seem not to have
been filed.74 The next question is why does this happen? Unfortunately, it
is not easy to determine this from official documents.
In Brazil, according to the legality principle, the Public Prosecutor’s
Office has no discretion and is obligated to prosecute every criminal
offence that comes to its attention or suggest to the judiciary a justified
termination of the proceeding.75 If the criminal judge does not agree with
the termination, the Head of the Public Prosecutors must decide whether to
end the case, investigate further, or immediately file the law suit. All of
72. Other cases: MUNDIAL
(https://www2.trf4.jus.br/trf4/controlador.php?acao=consulta_processual_resultado_pesq
uisa&txtValor=50670961820124047100&selOrigem=TRF&chkMostrarBaixados=&toda
spartes=S&selForma=NU&todasfases=&hdnRefId=c2da632eac749b8769f00db01b1b14
d3&txtPalavraGerada=Gvaj&txtChave=&numPagina=0. ); MAEDA (T.R.F.-3. Ap.
Crim. nº 0008358-25.2014.4.03.6181, São Paulo); KLABIN (T.R.F-3. Ap. Crim. nº
0002511-03.2018.4.03.6181, São Paulo); OGX (Juízo Federal, 3ª Vara Criminal, Rio de
Janeiro. Ação Penal nº 0029174- 94.2014.4.02.5101); JBS (Juízo Federal, 3ª Vara
Criminal, Rio de Janeiro. Ação Penal nº 0006243-26.2017.403.6181)
73. For a comparative empirical finding regarding insider trading enforcement
in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, United Kingdom and United
States, see: Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan, Ian Ramsay. The extent and intensity of
insider trading enforcement – an international comparison, Journal of Corporate Law
Studies, vol. 17, n. 1, 2017, p. 73-110.
74. For data before 2008, see Eduardo Ribeiro Faria de Oliveira, Tiago Bottino,
Seletividade do sistema penal dos crimes contra o mercado de capitais (Lei n. 6.385/76),
available at http://www.conpedi.org.br/manaus/arquivos/anais/fortaleza/3244.pdf
(showing that there is a selective criminal system for the capital markets crimes).
75. Art. 24 e 28, Brazilian Criminal Code.
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these decisions must be transparent. According to the law, there is no space
for unjustified decisions or a nontransparent system. The question that
arises with regard to whether this divergence of numbers is a consequence
of a communication problem with the CVM and the prosecutor or is linked
to internal issues of the Public Prosecutor’s Office which could
hypothetically argue that criminal issues related to the capital market are
not on the Public Prosecutor’s agenda.
As revealed by Davis, Machado, and Jorge “strict compliance with
this principle is practically impossible.”76 The authors point out that the
legality principle reduces discretionary powers, but does not totally
eliminate them, while also potentially making it difficult to implement
enforcement strategies.77 The impossibility of being accountable for
enforcement strategies makes more difficult the task of understanding the
ineffectiveness of the criminal consequences of insider trading and
suggesting improvements.
The first criminal case (Sadia/Perdigão) showed that the legal
provision alone was insufficient to truly criminalize insider trading. It was
first necessary to improve communication between the CVM and the Public
Prosecutor through cooperative agreement. However, the information flow
from the CVM to the Public Prosecutor is not publicly available. Nor, for
that matter, are the criteria for the actions of the Public Prosecutor
accessible from an analysis of the final results.
The decision to give the Public Prosecutor jurisdiction, depending
in certain ways on the CVM’s actions, reveals greater institutional
complexity that impacts the achievement of the strategy. Communication
is a precondition for institutions to work by exchanging information and
having clarity about the role that each one plays in the institutional design.
In the design that has been chosen, the administrative and criminal
processes seem to be complementary, as they should be, acting
collaboratively way so that the final result of the punishment message may
be achieved.78
In this relationship, it is necessary to consider the timing and
strategy of the actions of both institutions. In addition, it should be
questioned whether they should be working together or separately. In the
available cases, their joint action appears in different forms. In the
Sadia/Perdigão case, the criminal lawsuit came after the administrative
decision and counted on a joint effort by the CVM and the Public
Prosecutor. In two more recent cases (Mundial, OGX, and JBS) the criminal
lawsuit began before the administrative action and in an independent form.
76. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 7.
77. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 7.
78. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014.
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The goal here is not to attack the principle of independence between the
two spheres, but to point out that closer collaboration or more independent
action may impact the institutional design and the final result.
Despite the fact that it seems that only time will tell what the best
design is, this action may still be the object of better understanding and
eventual improvement. It may also be possible for us to better understand
the role of each level. As an exercise of comparison in studies on the
enforcement system of anti-corruption laws in Brazil, the multi-institutional
model79 or the modular institutional design is often deemed favorable to the
punishment system. 80
Based on the available information, it can be established that a precondition of good communication of penalization is the existence of a flow
of information along with transparency in the act of communicating. In
effect, there must be systemic control and, more importantly, effective
communication relating to the punishment strategy.
D. Civil Liability Sphere
The least effective of all the tools are direct suits by investors under
the Corporation Law or general principles of civil liability. We located just
one case81 over a period of 10 years, but none with a final decision.
Despite the fact that it is almost impossible to specify the victims of
insider trading and sue for compensation, the Public Prosecutor’s Office
and CVM filed two lawsuits jointly seeking compensation for losses caused
to the market.82 The cases ended with a consent decree that ordered the
payment of three times the gained value to the CVM and Fund for Defense
of Diffuse Interests, without any benefits to investors or Brazilian capital
markets. The agreement also prohibited the defendant from holding the
position of public listed companies or intermediaries in the capital market
for three years.
It is questionable whether this compensation instrument, processed
through a trial of public civil action, is necessary. In the context of the
enforcement system and the deterrence strategy, it is difficult to access the
real function of this action.
79. Mariana Mota Prado, Lindsey Carson. Brazilian anti-corruption legislation
and its enforcement: potential lessons for institutional design, IRIBA Working paper 09,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497936.
80. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 2.
81. T.J.R.T. Ap. Civ. 0085670-76.2015.8.19.0001, Rio de Janeiro, Relatora:
Des. Valéria Dacheux Nascimento, 25.06.2019, decision available at:
http://www1.tjrj.jus.br/gedcacheweb/default.aspx?UZIP=1&GEDID=0004B9DA6837C
DA16F05729C2BE2EE95F687C50A3E1F535E
82. See note 68 and 70 supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Brazilian legal system has rules that forbid the use of nonpublic
information and provides sanctions through the administrative and criminal
punishment systems, in addition to creating civil liabilities. The data
presented suggests that the rule is enforced.
However, an overview of institutional design and its various
instruments reveals the complexity of the system and sheds light on the
importance of understanding the alternative legal tools available to
institutions, as well as the coordination, competition, or conflict among the
institutions responsible for enforcement of insider trading laws.
The main empirical finding is that Brazil is actively enforcing its
insider trading laws, and this undoubtedly is having a deterrent effect.
However, we have observed that the existing cases reached different
outcomes depending on which regulatory instruments were applied and
which institutions had been proactive in verifying the illicit activity. While
there may be benefits from this multi-institutional model, the existence of
a diversity of results may affect the deterrent effect of enforcement.

